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HEARSAY: TRAPS & PROBLEM ISSUES
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This article highlights a number of current hearsay issues. It is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject but
rather a catalog of issues that are important either because
they are problematic or because they arise frequently in
criminal litigation.
RIGHTTO PRESENT A DEFENSE
Ohio Rule 802 provides that hearsay may be admissible
if it fits an exception recognized by the "Constitution of the
United States" or by the "Constitution of the State of Ohio:·
The leading case on this point is Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the United States Supreme
Court held that state evidentiary rules that precluded the admission of critical and reliable evidence denied the defendant due process. One of the rules in Chambers that made
defense evidence inadmissible was the hearsay rule, i.e.,
' Mississippi's failure to admit declarations against penal in" terest. According to the Court, "[i]n these circumstances,
where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice:· ld. at
302.
In a later case, the Court again overturned a conviction
because the application of the hearsay rule precluded the
admission of defense evidence. The Court commented:
Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes
within Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this
case its exclusion constituted a violation of the Due
l;
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
(
excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical
'
issue in the punishment phase of the trial ... and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability.
Georgia v. Green, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
t~ Thus, the admission of hearsay evidence offered by the de~· fendant in a criminal case may be constitutionally compelled
tt-, - provided a showing of reliability is made. See generally 2
W McCormick, Evidence § 252, at 129 (4th ed. 1992) ("[T]he
Fl. due process clause may require the admission of hearsay,
though inadmissible under applicable hearsay rules, if of
~'; sufficient reliability and importance:'); Clinton, The Right to
, \ Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee
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in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711 (1976).
Several Ohio cases have discussed this issue. In State v.
Sumlin, 69 Ohio St.3d 105, 107, 630 N.E.2d 681 (1994), the
Ohio Supreme Court, citing Chambers, recognized that
hearsay evidence that does not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions may nevertheless be admissible "pursuant to general principles of due process:' The Court went
on, however, to rule that Sumlin was not such a case.
Similarly, the court of appeals recently addressed the issue
in State v. Patterson, i 10 Ohio App.3d 264, 673 N.E.2d
1001 (1996). The court wrote:
Chambers does not stand for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to introduce a// exculpatory and inculpatory matter in out-of-court statements; rather,
Chambers stands for the broad proposition that the
hearsay rule "should not be applied mechanistically" to
exclude hearsay testimony that is trustworthy in cases
where an accused's constitutional rights are implicated. Here, in accordance with the Supreme Court's
holding in Chambers, the trial court allowed the introduction of Roberts's hearsay statements that were
against his penal interest and thus were likely to be
trustworthy. ld. at 274 (quoting Chambers).
The due process principle recognized in Chambers is important in Ohio because Ohio has not adopted a residual
hearsay exception, which is found in the Federal Rules and
most other states. (As of December 1, 1997, the two residual exceptions found in Federal Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5) have been combined in a new Federal Rule 807).
The Chambers principle arises in other contexts, such as
the rape shield law and polygraph evidence. See 1
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence §
404.8 (1996) (rape shield law: constitutionality); 1 Giannelli
& lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 8.3(D) (2d ed. 1993)
(polygraph: constitutional arguments). Indeed, one commentator has observed: "Broadly construed, [Chambers}
appears to recognize that the accused in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to introduce any exculpatory evidence, unless the state can demonstrate that it is so
inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no rational
basis for evaluating its truth." Westen, The Compulsory
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Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 151-52 (1974).

contained therein. See State v. Kinley, 72 Ohio St.3d 491,
498, 651 N.E.2d 419 (1995) ("The tape was not offered to
prove the truth of any statement or assertion contained in
the recording.").

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
Objection to prosecution hearsay evidence based on
confrontation grounds should specify the Ohio as well as
the United States Constitution. In State v. Storch, 66 Ohio
St.3d 280,291,612 N.E.2d 305 (1993), the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that the admission of a statement pursuant to a
firmly rooted hearsay exception "may violate our state constitutional right of confrontation:' Significantly, the Court indicated that the Ohio Constitution provides greater confrontation protection than that provided by the federal constitution. The Court commented that the current interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment by the United States Supreme
Court "provides less protection for the accused than the protection provided by the Sixth Amendment as traditionally
construed and by the express words of Section 10, Article I
of the Ohio Constitution." ld. at 291. The Ohio Constitution,
in the Court's view, generally requires a demonstration of
the declarant's unavailability before hearsay statements are
admissible:
We construe the right to confrontation contained in
Section 10, Article I to require live testimony where
reaso·nably possible. However, circumstances may
exist where the evidence clearly indicates that a child
may suffer significant emotional harm by being forced
to testify in the actual presence of a person he or she
is accusing of abuse. In such circumstances, the child
may be considered unavailable for purposes of the
Rules of Evidence and the out-of-court statements admitted without doing violence to Section 10, Article I,
assuming Evid.R. 807 is otherwise satisfied. ld. at 293.
See also State v. Ulis, 91 Ohio App.3d 656, 633 N.E.2d 562
(1993) (following Storch); State v. McWhite, 91 Ohio App.3d
508, 513, 632 N.E.2d 1320 (1993) ("While we strongly disagree with the analysis and conclusion of the Ohio Supreme
Court in [Storch], as to requirements it imposes on the implementation of the Ohio Rules of Evidence through a manufactured interpretation of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, that is inconsistent with what is stated in the
rules themselves, contrary to its own prior decision, and
above and beyond what is required by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
United States Supreme Court, we reluctantly agree Storch
requires this court to reach this result:').
For a discussion of the right of confrontation, see 2
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Evidence §§
802.8 & 9 (1996).

Assertive Conduct
Rule 801 also treats nonverbal conduct intended as an
assertion (assertive conduct) as hearsay. McCormick observed that "non-verbal conduct may unmistakably be just
as assertive in nature as though expressed in words. No
one would contend, if, in response to a question 'Who did
it?', one of the auditors held up her hand, that this gesture
could be treated as different from an oral or written statement." 2 McCormick, Evidence § 250, at 107 (4th ed. 1992).
Accord Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence Handbook §
801 .2, at 711 (3d ed. 1991) ("Nonverbal conduct may on occasion clearly be the equivalent of an assertive statement,
that is, done for the purpose of deliberate communication,
and thus classified as hearsay:').
The federal drafters provided another illustration: "Some
nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a
suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement."
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 801. See also
United States v. Caro, 569 F.2d 411, 416 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1978)
(in response to question where drugs came from, the person pointed to particular vehicle); Stevenson v.
Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 779 (Va. 1977) (Wife's handing
to police of the clothes the defendant was wearing on day of
the homicide pursuant to police request is hearsay.).
Nonassertive Conduct: "Implied Assertions"
Conduct that is not intended by the declarant to be an assertion is not encompassed by the definition of "statement"
in Rule 801 (A). Accordingly, the hearsay rule is not a bar to
the admissibility of evidence of nonassertive conduct. For
example, evidence of flight from the scene of a crime is not
hearsay under Rule 801 because such conduct is not intended to be an assertion. Similarly, in United States v.
Zenni, 492 F.Supp. 464 (E.D. 1980), while searching the location of an illegal bookmaking operation, the police received telephone calls from persons attempting to place
bets. The court ruled that the bettors did not intend to make
an assertion and therefore their conduct was not hearsay.
There are only a few Ohio cases on this issue. In State v.
Kniep, 87 Ohio App.3d 681, 685, 622 N.E.2d 1138 (1993),
the defendant was accused of physically abusing his infant
daughter. At trial, the prosecution showed a videotape of
the daughter crying while the defendant held her. The defendant objected on the ground that the depiction of her reaction to him was hearsay. The appellate court found that
the daughter's conduct was nonassertive and thus not
hearsay. As the court noted, the infant was six months old
at the time of the videotaping; "[g]iven her age and concomitant mental abilities, [her] crying cannot be considered conduct intended by her to be an assertion of her belief:' The
court concluded: "Nonverbal conduct is hearsay only when
it is intended by the actor to be an assertion of his belief."
While this result correctly addresses the hearsay issue, it ignores the relevance issue. The relevance of the evidence is
dubious at best, and should have been inadmissible under
Rule 403(A) as unfairly prejudicial.

HEARSAY "STATEMENTS": DEFINED
Ohio Rule 801 (A) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by him as an assertion."
Tape Recordings
Tape recordings, including the audio part of a videotape,
often raise hearsay issues because the statements on the
tape were made out of court. For example, in State v.
Paxton, 110 Ohio App.3d 305, 318, 67 4 N.E.2d 379 (1995),
the court of appeals wrote: "The inclusion of all of the audio
portions of the videotapes constituted prejudicial error in
this case, as several statements which were played for the
jury were ... outside the scope of a present sense impression [exception] ... :· Of course, the tape recording is
hearsay only if it is offered for the truth of the assertions
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that he ran the defendant's name through a computer and
the resulting printout read "suspected" narcotics smuggler).

STATEMENTS NOT OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH

Explaining Police Behavior

It is axiomatic that out-of-court statements are hearsay
only if offered to prove the truth of the assertion. This rule,
~._·"· however, is often abused. For example, the admissibility of
\'t out-of-court statements explaining police behavior raises
significant issues under Rule 403. In State v. Williams, 115
Ohio App.3d 24, 684 N.E.2d 358 (1996), detectives testified
to information provided by informants. The court of appeals
upheld the admissibility of the informants' statements as
non hearsay evidence: "[T]he purpose of this testimony was
not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to
explain what the mind-set of the officers had been when
they executed the search warrant. The courts of this state
have generally held that testimony concerning the basis or
reason for an officer's actions during an investigation is not
considered hearsay:' ld. at 44. See also State v. Thomas, 61
Ohio St.2d 223, 232, 400 N.E.2d 401 (1980) ("The testimony at issue was offered to explain the subsequent investigative activities of the witnesses. It was not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted:').
There are several problems with such cases. First, unless the defense makes an issue of how the investigation
was conducted, such background information is simply not
relevant. See United States v. Lamberty, 778 F.2d 59, 61
(1st Cir. 1985) ("We do not find that the evidence introduced
to show the government's motive in setting the trap is in any
way relevant to proving the elements of the counts charged.
While the jurors may have been curious as to why the inspectors began their operation, enlightenment on this matter had no probative value."); United States v. Taylor, 900
F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1990) (reason why suspect targeted not
(' relevant to guilt).
Second, despite a limiting instruction, the jury will often
use the information substantively, thereby raising both
hearsay and confrontation issues. McCormick wrote:
[O]ne area of apparently widespread abuse should be
noted. In criminal cases, an arresting or investigating
officer should not be put in the false position of seeming just to have happened upon the scene; he should
be allowed some explanation of his presence and conduct. His testimony that he acted "upon information received," or words to that effect, should be sufficient.
Nevertheless, cases abound in which the officer is allowed to relate historical aspects of the case, replete
with hearsay statements in the form of complaints and
reports, on the ground that he was entitled to give the
information upon which he acted. The need for the evidence is slight, the likelihood of misuse great. 2
McCormick, Evidence § 249, at 104 (4th ed. 1992) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th
Cir. 1997) ("Courts and commentators have recognized that
out-of-court statements should not be admitted to explain
why a law enforcement agency began an investigation if the
statements present too great a danger of prejudice:');
Garrett v. United States, 78 F.3d 1296, ~ 302-03 (8th Cir.)
("fairness demands that the government find a way to get
. the background into evidence without the hearsay"), cert.
,c '. denied, 117 S.Ct. 37 4 (1996); United States v. Hernandez,
750 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1985) (referral by U.S. Customs of
defendant as a drug smuggler inadmissible to explain motivation behind OEA investigation); United States v. Escobar,
67 4 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982) (error to allow officer to testify

STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION
Under Ohio Rule 801 (0)(1 )(c), a witness's prior statement "of identification of a person soon after perceiving" that
person is admissible as substantive evidence "if the circumstances demonstrate the reliability of the prior identification."
For example, an identification made at a lineup, show-up,
photographic display, or prior hearing falls within the rule.
Several cases addressing this rule have caused confusion. In State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 126, 545
N.E.2d 1220 (1989), the Ohio Supreme Court indicated
that, in child sexual abuse cases, "Evid.R. 801 (0)(1 )(c) may
be used to admit the out-of-court statement of a child declarant identifying, to a third person, the perpetrator of alleged child abuse." In State v. Storch, 66 Ohio St.3d 280,
292, 612 N.E.2d 305 (1993), the Court commented that this
rule would permit the admission of a videotape of a child
abuse victim's statements:
In many instances, Evid.R. 801 (0)(1) or other Rules of
Evidence would allow for admission of the audio tapes
or vide9tapes. If taping occurs and the tape is actually
admitted into evidence, the trier of fact would have the
benefit of the child's actual words and at least some insight as to the child's demeanor. The trial court also
would have the benefit of the actual questions or conversation which led up to the child's indication that an
individual had abused the child. Certainly the questions asked can be a significant factor in determining
the reliability of the response ....
These cases raise serious problems. First, the rule explicitly requires cross-examination of the declarant "concerning the statement." See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S.
554 (1988). This means the child must testify at trial.
Second, only an "identification" is admissible; a discourse
about the crime is not admissible. Finally, the legislative history indicates that "stranger" identifications were the focus of
the rule. In other words, identifications at lineups, showups,
and photographic displays are admissible, because they are
more reliable than an in-court identification of the accused.
In State v. Turvey, 84 Ohio App.3d 724, 7 41, 618 N.E.2d
214 (1992), the court of appeals correctly observed that the
rule had been misused in the post-Boston cases. The court
wrote:
[A] difference exists between the thirteen pre-Boston
and the ten post-Boston Ohio appellate court cases
citing Evid.R. 801 (0)(1 )(c). The pre-Boston cases generally involved identifications made by strangers to law
enforcement personnel during the course of investigations conducted shortly after the crime. The stranger
often, but not always, identified the defendant among
others in a line-up or photo array. In the pre-Boston
cases, the identifications were necessary to prove no
other person committed the crime.
By contrast, the majority of the post-Boston cases
citing [the rule] involved close relatives- two fathers,
three stepfathers, and one uncle- of child victim-declarants. The post-Boston identifications generally involved identifications made by children to mothers or_
doctors weeks or months after the crime. The child observed neither the defendant nor the defendant's photograph during the identification. In the post-Boston
cases, the identifications addressed not the identitv of
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Edwards 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976)
(syllabus: para. 1a) and State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St.
364,371,114 N.E.1038 (1916)).
see also State v. Clark, 106 Ohio App.3d 426, 431, 666
N.E.2d 308 (1995) ("The corpus delicti rule requires that the
state present 'some evidence outside of the confession that
tends to prove some material element of the crime charged'
in order to admit a confession:') (quoting State v. Maranda).

the defendant, but rather addressed the fact a crime
was committed. ld. at 739-40.
The principal problem is Boston itself and not merely the
post-Boston cases.
ACCUSED'S ADMISSIONS
Under Rule 801 (D)(2)(a), statements of a party are admissible as substantive evidence if offered against that
party. The confession of a criminal defendant is an admission of a party-opponent.
A party cannot, however, introduce his own statements
under this rule. In In re Coy, 67 Ohio St.3d 215, 218, 616
N.E.2d 1105 (1993), the Ohio Supreme Court correctly
noted that the party admission rule "applies to statements
offered against a party where the statements are the party's
own. Here the statements offered were [those of a child
sexual abuse victim]. They were offered by [the victim]
against her father. They were not her own statements being
offered against her:'

ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS: BY SILENCE
Under Ohio Rule 801 (D)(2)(b), a statement about which
a party "has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth" is
admissible as substantive evidence if offered against that
party. A party may adopt the statement of a third person by
failing to deny or correct under circumstances in which it
would be natural to deny or correct the truth of the statement- adoption by silence. See Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. Evid. R. 801 ("When silence is relied upon, the
theory is that the person would, under the circumstances,
protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue:'); 2
McCormick, Evidence § 262, at 176 (4th ed. 1992).
The silence of an accused after receiving Miranda warnings raises co_nstitutional issues. See 1 Giannelli & Snyder,
Baldwin's Ohio Practice § 613.10 (1996) (discussing Doyle
v. Ohio). The adoption-by-silence issue, however, may also
arise outside the confession context. See United States v.
Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("When Monroe
told Officer Dunston that he could get another rock of crack
from 'my buddy,' Beckham immediately got up from his chair,
walked over to a stash of crack that was packaged for distribution, and began to open it. By that action, Beckham indicated his endorsement of Monroe's statement:').
The Ohio cases have recognized the admission-by-silence rule. See Hoover v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41, 47, 109
N.E. 626 (1914); Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 (1881). In
Zeller v. State, 123 Ohio St. 519, 523, 176 N.E. 81 (1931 ),
the Ohio Supreme Court stated: "The only theory upon
which any confession [admission] by silence is admissible is
that the statement of the third person, in the presence of the
accused, is made under such circumstances that the silence of the accused gives rise to a natural and reasonable
inference of assent thereto ... :· In Geiger v. State, 70 Ohio
St. 400, 413, 71 N.E. 721 (1904), the Supreme Court commented: "We cannot refrain from the observation, that before a court admits this class of confessions, great caution
should be exercised .... it is not every instance of silence in
the hearing of accusation that renders it admissible, as admitting guilt." In many cases the courts have found that the
circumstances did not require a response. In other words,
silence is not equivalent to assent. See also Griffith v.
Zipperwick, 28 Ohio St. 388, 409 (1876); Walker v. State, 37
Ohio App. 540, 175 N.E. 29 (1930).
This is consistent with McCormick's position that "(t]he
essential inquiry in each case is whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have denied the statement:' 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 262, at 178 (4th ed. 1992).
It is not sufficient that the statement was made in the presence of a party. McCormick fists several factors that should
be considered in determining admissibility:
(1) The statement must have been heard by the party
claimed to have acquiesced. (2) It must have been understood by the party. (3) The subject matter must have
been within the party's knowledge .... (4) Physical or
emotional impediments to responding must not be

Corpus Delicti Rule
Like many jurisdictions, Ohio imposes a corroboration requirement on the admissibility of confessions. Under this
rule, there must be some independent evidence of the corpus delicti before a confession is admissible. See State v.
Black, 54 Ohio St.2d 304, 376 N.E.2d 948 (1978); State v.
Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Maranda,
94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916); State v. King, 10
Ohio App.3d 161, 460 N.E.2d 1383 (1983); State v. Duerr, 8
Ohio App.3d 396, 457 N.E.2d 834 {1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 816 {1983); State v. Ralston, 67 Ohio App.2d 81, 425
N.E.2d 916 (1979).
The corroboration requirement "has traditionally been
based upon concern that convictions might result from false
confessions:· 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 145, at 556 (4th ed.
1992). See also 7 Wigmore, Evidence§§ 2070-75
(Chadbourn rev. 1978).
Several recent cases have addressed this issue. The
court of appeals in State v. Nobles, 106 Ohio App.3d 246,
665 N.E.2d 1137 (1995), explained the rule as follows:
The corpus delicti r.ule, as employed in the context
of extrajudicial confessions, is informed by a desire to
protect unfortunate persons who confess to crimes
that they not only did not commit themselves, but
which were never committed by anyone. Before the
rule was formed, it sometimes happened that a person
'would confess to killing another, be convicted of that
killing and put to death, only to have the supposed
murder victim turn up later, alive and healthy....
The rule ... is applied to all crimes, not homicide
alone. Before an extrajudicial confession of a crime is
competent to be admitted at the confessor's trial, the
state must first introduce evidence independent of the
confession tending to establish "(1) the act, and (2) the
criminal agency of that act:' ... The evidence adduced
must meet some essential element of the crime
charged, though it need not meet all of them .... The
evidence need not be so strong that it is capable of
persuading a factfinder on some element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, but "there must be some
proof, not necessarily direct and positive, usually but
circumstantial, tending to prove the fact that a crime
was committed." ld. at 261-62 (quoting State v.
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present. (5) The personal makeup of the speaker, e.g.,
young child, or the person's relationship to the party or
the event, e.g., bystander, may be such as to make it
unreasonable to expect a denial. (6) Probably most important of all, the statement itself must be such as
would, if untrue, call for a denial under the circumstances. 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 262, at 177-78 (4th
ed 1992).
See also 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1072 (Chadbourn rev
1972); State v. White, 110 Ohio App.3d 347, 360, 674
N.E.2d 405 (1996) ("A person admits the truth of a statement by adoption when that person hears, understands,
and acquiesces in another person's statement when a reasonable person could and would have spoken out in denial:').

earlier.
Prosecutor's Admissions. In contrast, the agent-admission rule applies to the prosecuting attorney. See United
States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
("The Federal Rules clearly contemplate that the federal
government is a party-opponent of the defendant in criminal
cases ... :'). In addition to agent admissions, these statements may also be adoptive admissions. In United States v.
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988), the First Circuit ruled
that a government brief in a civil case, which contradicted a
prosecution witness, constituted an adoptive admission:
The Justice Department here has, as clearly as possible, manifested its belief in the substance of the contested documents; it has submitted them to other federal courts to show the truth of the matter contained
therein. We agree with Justice (then Judge) Stevens
that the assertions made by the government in a formal prosecution (and, by analogy, a formal civil defense) "establish the position of the United States and
not merely the views of its agents who participate
therein. ld. at 131 (citing United States v. Powers, 467
F.2d 1089, 1097 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
See also United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218, 1221 (4th
Cir. 1986) (statements by the prosecution during voir dire
would be binding against the government if they had constituted a clear and unambiguous admission). Other examples include:
(1) Affidavits, United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933,
938 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[W]here ... the government
has indicated in a sworn affidavit to a judicial officer that it believes particular statements are trustworthy, it may not sustain an objection to the subsequent introduction of those statements on
grounds that they are hearsay:').
(2) Search warrants, United States v. Ramirez, 894
F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen the government advances a statement of its agent in a judicial
proceeding to obtain a search warrant, the government has adopted the content of the statement,
and a criminal defendant may introduce the statement as a party admission under Fed. R. Evid.
801 (d)(2)(B):').
(3) Bill of particulars, United States v. GAF Corp., 928
F.2d 1253, 1260-61 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Confidence in
the justice system cannot be affirmed if any party
is free, wholly without explanation, to make a fun, damental change in its version of the facts between
trials, and then conceal this change from the final
trier of the facts .... A bill of particulars ... is prepared, reviewed, and presented by an agent of the
United States:'), and
(4) Government manuals. United States v. Van Griffin,
87 4 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1989) ("We do not say
that every publication of every branch of government ... can be treated as a party admission by the
United States under Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(D). In
this case the government department charged with
the development of rules for highway safety was
the relevant and competent section of the government: its pamphlet on sobriety testing was an admissible party admission.").
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AGENT ADMISSIONS: BY ATTORNEYS & POLICE
Under Ohio Rule 801 (D)(2)(c), statements made by a
person who was authorized by a party to make a statement
are admissible as substantive evidence if offered against
that party. Significantly, the statement of an attorney may
be admissible against the client as either an authorized admission, because the attorney usually has "speaking authority;' or as an agent a·dmission. See United States v. GAF
Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1991 ).
Defense Opening Statement. In United States v.
McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984), a prosecution expert
concluded that a xerox machine located at the place of employment of the accused's wife made photocopies associated with the crime. In his opening statement, the defense
counsel stated that a defense expert would testify that this
machine did not make these copies. The trial terminated in
i' a mistrial during the prosecution case-in-chief, and the de. fense expert subsequently learned that his former teacher
would be a substitute prosecution expert at the retrial. At
the retrial, the defense position changed significantly. The
defense opening statement in the earlier trial was introduced by the prosecution in the later trial as an admission:
"The expert testimony about the xerox machine promised by
Kennedy [defense counsel] in the opening statement at the
[earlier] trial was in support of a factual claim that Olive
McKeon had not copied the documents. Kennedy's opening
argument at the [later] trial, stating that Olive McKeon had
indeed copied the documents at the request of her husband, was facially and irreconcilably at odds with the earlier
assertion." ld. at 33.
Police Admissions. Generally, the agent-admission rule
does not apply to law enforcement officers. Most federal
cases have held that the statements of government agents
are not admissible against the prosecution under Federal
Rule 801 (d)(1 )(D). E.g., United States v. Prevatte, 16 F. 3d
767,779 n. 9 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kampiles, 609
F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954
(1980); United States v. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. 1183, 1185
(D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, 835 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987). The
leading case is United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d
Cir. 1967).
This position, however, has been challenged. See
lmwinkelried, Of Evidence and Equal Protection: The
.I ~Jnconstitutionality of Excluding Government Agents
'Statements Offered as Vicarious Admissions Against the
Prosecution, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 269 (1986). In addition to the
equal protection argument, this rule should be attacked
under the right-to-present-a-defense line of cases discussed
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See also State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 107, 684
N.E.2d 668 (1 997) (tape of 911 call by victims' son reporting
that he had found his parents' bodies properly admitted
under 803(2)).

CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS
Under Ohio Rule 801 (D){2)(e), a statement made by a
coconspirator of a party during and i~ furth.erance_of the
conspiracy is admissible as substant1ve ev1dence If offered
against that pa~ty.. The crim~ of conspiracy need not be
charged in the md1ctment or mformat1on. Indeed, the rule
also applies in civil cases.

STATE OF MIND
Under Ohio Rule 803(3), statements of presently existing
state of mind are excepted from the hearsay rule - provided state of mind is a material issue in the case. See Hong v.
Children's Memorial Hospital, 993 F.2d 1257, 1265 (7th Cir.
1993) (The rule "does not authorize receipt of a statement
by one person as proof of another's state of mind:'), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994).
In State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 514 N.E.2d
394 (1 987), six witnesses testified that the victim was ''fearful or apprehensive" of the defendant. The Ohio Supreme
Court held that these statements were admissible under
Rule 803(3). Similarly, in State v. Wages, 87 Ohio App.3d
780, 789, 623 N.E.2d 193 (1993), a murder victim's statements to her friends were admitted. According to the court
of appeals, these statements came within Rule 803(3):
"The victim made the statements at a time which reflected
her state of mind; that the victim was fearful and scared:'
The Ohio Supreme Court revisited the issue in State v.
Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 338, 652 N.E.2d 1000 (1995),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 820 (1996). The Court upheld the
trial court's decision to admit the testimony of witnesses
about statements of the victim that she feared the defendant:
The trial court correctly ruled that the statements concerning [the victim's] state of mind, i.e., her fear of appellant, were admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 803(3)
and State v. Apanovitch .... The trial judge went to
great lengths to ensure that the witnesses testified only
to the fact that [the victim] expressed fear of the appellant. The trial judge did not permit any testimony regarding the basis of [the victim's] fear.
The following year, in State v. Awkal, 76 Ohio St.3d 324,
331, 667 N.E.2d 960 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 776
(1 997), the Court noted that, in Apanovitch, it had "limited
this type of testimony to that reflecting the state of mind of
the victim, but not the reasons underlying that state of
mind:' The Court found the statements were erroneously
admitted because they concerned the reasons for the victim's fear, that the defendant had threatened the victim. and
thus went beyond the limitation in Apanovitch. See also
United States v. Joe, 8 F. 3d 1488, 1492-93 (1Oth Cir. 1993)
("Ms. Joe's statement to Dr. Smoker, though indicating her
state of mind, also included an assertion of why she was
afraid (i.e., because she thought her husband might kill her).
This portion of Ms. Joe's statement is clearly a 'statement of
memory or belief' expressly excluded by the Rule 803(3) exception:'), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994).
The Apanovitch decision itself is problematic. The statements did reflect the victim's state of mind, and thus satisfied Rule 803(3). However, that state of mind was not a material issue; the defendant's, not the victim's, state of mind is
an element in a homicide case. In contrast, in an extortion
case such statements would be relevant because the victim's fear is an element of the crime. See United States v.
Adcock, 558 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 921 (1 977). McCormick discussed this problem:
A recurring problem arises in connection with the
admissibility of accusatory statements made before

Independent Proof Requirement

kI

In contrast to the federal rule, the Ohio rule expressly requires that the conspiracy, as well as the declarant's and defendant's participation, be established "upon independent
proof of the conspiracy." In other words, the statement itself
cannot be used to establish the existence of the conspiracy.
The independent proof requirement is based on Michigan
Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) and pre-Rules Ohio law. See State v.
Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 240, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1 977)
(conspiracy established by "other evidence"), vacated on
other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1 978); State v. Osborne, 49
Ohio St.2d 135, 143, 359 N.E.2d 78 (1976), vacated on
other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1 978); State v. Carver, 30
Ohio St.2d 280,287,285 N.E.2d 26 (1972), cert. denied,
409 u.s. 1044 (1972).
Federal practice is different. In Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the Federal Rules abolished the independent
proof requirement. In contrast to the Ohio rule, the federal
rule does not include the "upon independent proof" language. In 1997, the federal rule was amended to codify the
Bourjaily holding. The following sentence was added to
Rule 801 (d)(2): "The contents of the statement shall be
considered but are not alone sufficient to establish ... the
existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of
the declarant and the party against whom the statement is
offered under subdivision (E)."
A recent Ohio case recognized this point. See State v.
Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 550, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1 995)
("Inclusion of the phrase 'upon independent proof of the
conspiracy' in Evid.R. 801 (D)(2)(e) distinguishes Ohio practice from practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
precludes a finding that the statement itself may be used to
establish the existence of the conspiracy. See Giannelli,
Ohio Rules of Evidence Handbook (5 Ed.1 994) 211, 214."),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 575 (1995).

PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS &
EXCiTED UTTERANCES
Ohio Rule 803(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for
present sense impressions, and Rule 803(2) recognizes a
hearsay exception for excited utterances. These rules are
often used to introduce 911 tapes. For example, in State v.
Kinley, 72 Ohio St.3d 491, 651 N.E.2d 419 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1324 (1996), the Court held that statements
of the victim's son to a 911 operator reporting that the defendant and the victim were fighting "'were clearly admissible as "excited utterances" pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2)."' ld. at
497 (quoting the court of appeals). The statements related
to a startling event (the fight) and were made while the declarant was under the stress of the excitement caused by
the startling event. Although the Court did not discuss Rule
803(1 ), those statements would also have been admissible
as present sense impressions. They were statements describing an event (the fighting of the defendant and the victim) made at the time the declarant was perceiving the
event.
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that has divided some appellate courts in Ohio concerns the
admissibility of reports from private DNA laboratories. In
State v. Lane, 108 Ohio App.3d 477, 488, 671 N.E.2d 272
(1995). the court of appeals considered the admissibility of
a casefile containing results of DNA testing prepared by
Cellmark Laboratories. The court stated that, "[w]here a
document generally satisfies the elements of Evid.R. 803(6),
but was prepared in anticipation of litigation, the underlying
rationale of trustworthiness is supplanted by a natural motivation to color the facts in favor of the requesting entity:•
The court concluded that "[t]he DNA casefile prepared by
Cellmark was certainly prepared as part of its business. Yet
the casefile was prepared for the sole purpose of litigation
and, therefore, lacks the requisite trustworthiness:· ld. at
477.
The court noted, however, that in State v. Fontenette,
1991 WL 184324 (unreported) (1991 ), another court of appeals "held that records of DNA evidence prepared for trial
are admissible as a business records exception to the
hearsay rule pursuant to Evid.R. 803(6)." 108 Ohio App.3d
at 487-88.

the act by the victims of homicide. If the statement is
merely an expression of fear- i.e., "I am afraid of D"
-no hearsay problem is involved, since the statement
falls within the hearsay exception for statements of
mental or emotional condition. This does not, howev"·. er, resolve the question of admissibility. The victim's
emotional state must relate to some legitimate issue in
the case ....
... [Tlhe most likely inference that jurors may draw
from the existence of fear ... is that some conduct of
the defendant, probably mistreatment or threats, occurred to cause the fear. The possibility of overpersuasion, the prejudicial character of the evidence, and the
relative weakness and speculative nature of the inference, all argue against admissibility as a matter of relevance. 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 276, at 243-44 (4th
ed. 1992).
The Ohio cases fail to reveal any reason why the victims'
state of mind might be relevant.
In another context, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
the problem. In State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 119-20,
509 N.E.2d 383 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 916 (1988),
the mother of a victim of rape and murder was permitted to
testify that her daughter told her that she intended to remain
a virgin. The Court acknowledged that the statement satisfied the requirements of Rule 803(3), but found that "[t]he
relevance of [the victim's] statement to the issue of her nonconsent is tenuous at best. ... The potential for prejudice in
[the] statement is considerable. We believe it should not
have been admitted:'
Objection to such statements on relevance (Rule 401 ),
unfair prejudice (Rule 403(A)), and confrontation grounds
\,,,should be made in every case.

PUBLIC RECORDS
Ohio Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay exception for
public records and reports. These records often contain
double hearsay by declarants who are not public officials.
For example, in State v. York, 115 Ohio App.3d 245, 685
N.E.2d 261 (1996), the court of appeals held inadmissible
an accident report, made by a state highway patrol officer,
because the report contained statements of one of the drivers involved in the accident. The court stated that a "police
report generally constitutes a public record for purposes of
Evid.R. 803(8) .... However, the statements made therein
must be either the firsthand observations of the official making the report or those of one with a duty to report to the
public official." ld. at 248 (citing 2 Giannelli & Snyder,
Evidence§ 801.38, at 148 (1996)). The court noted that it
could find "nothing in the law which imposes such an official
duty on a party involved in an accident." ld. The court continued:
R.C. 5503.02(A), which requires State Highway Patrol
troopers to investigate and report on traffic accidents,
places no duty on an accident victim to make such a
report. Persons involved in accidents are under a duty
to report the accident to the registrar of motor vehicles,
R.C. 4509.06, and they are required to stop and give
their name, address and vehicle registration number
to the other party involved. R.C. 4549.02. However,
'neither of these statutes places an express official duty
on an individual to report his or her preaccident observations to an investigating officer. The absence of any
such official duty breaks the link in Evid.R. 803(8)(b)
which would make [the driver's] statements admissible
into evidence. Those statements could not be admitted as part of [the state trooper's] report, and the trial
court properly excluded them below. ld. at 248-49.
See also Pool v. Wade, 115 Ohio App.3d 449, 453-54, 685
N.E.2d 794 (1996) (FDA bulletin held inadmissible under
Evid.R. 803(8)(b) because it contained "hearsay statements
which were not firsthand observations of the official making
the report and ... evaluative or investigative information
from laypersons:').

MEDICAL TREATMENT STATEMENTS
Rule 803(4) recognizes a hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, including a description of medical history, past or
present symptoms, pain, sensations, and the inception or
general character of the cause or external source if reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Although the rule
requires the statement be made for medical diagnosis or
treatment, the statement need not be made to a physician.
"Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or
even members of the family might be included:' Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 803. E.g., United States v.
Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1992) (clinical psychologist), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 976 (1992).
Nevertheless, the basic requirements of the exception
still apply. For example, in State v. Jones, 114 Ohio App.3d
306, 321, 683 N.E.2d 87 (1996), the court of appeals observed: "Appellant argues that because Falke is a social
worker whose function did not include diagnosis or treatment and that Kimberly Pizzo's statements were not taken
for the purpose of treatment or diagnosis, Evid.R. 803(4) is
not applicable. This argument, as even appellee concedes,
appears to have some force." Similarly, in State v. Chappell,
97 Ohio App.3d 515, 646 N.E.2d 1191 (1994), the court
stated that Rule 803(4) does not apply where a social work,() ~er's function was neither diagnosis nor treatment.
BUSINESS RECORDS
Ohio Rule 803(6) recognizes a hearsay exception for
records of regularly conducted business activities. An issue
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is a strategic choice and does not preclude his adversary's
use of the deposition at a subsequent proceeding."); United
States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (1st Cir. 1979)
("Defense counsel made a tactical decision not to question
Smith [at the suppression hearing]; this does not mean they
were denied an opportunity to do so:'), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 967 (1980).
This issue was raised but not decided in United States v.
Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992), on remand, 974 F.2d 231,
237-41 (2d Cir. 1990).

RULE 804: UNAVAILABILITY
Rule 804(A) contains five conditions of unavailability.
Federal courts have recognized a sixth, usually called "forfeiture by wrongdoing:' In 1997, a new division was added
to Federal Rule 804(8)(6): "A statement offered against a
party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that
was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the
declarant as a witness." It applies to actions taken after the
event to prevent a witness from testifying. The federal note
states: "The wrongdoing need not consist of a criminal act.
The rule applies to all parties, including the government. ...
The usual Rule 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard has been adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule
804(b)(6) seeks to discourage:' Advisory Committee's Note,
Fed. Evid. R. 804 (1997). ·

-.,
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STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTERESTS
Ohio Rule 804(8)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for
declarations against interest.
Corroboration Requirement
The rule provides that a "statement tending to expose the
?eclarant to criminal liability, whether offered to exculpate or
Inculpate the accused, is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement." In State v. Branham, 104 Ohio App.3d 355, 359,
662 N.E.2d 54 (1995), the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's determination that corroboration was lacking for several reasons:
In this case, the trial court found insufficient corroborating circumstances to establish the trustworthiness
of [the declarant's] statements, since (the declarant]
had a motive to fabricate, had made at least some of
the statements in jest, and had told numerous contradictory stories. The trial court concluded that since appellant and [the declarant] were involved in an intimate
relationship, [the declarant] had a motive to make the
statements to assist in the acquittal of appellant, her
paramour. When the statements were made, the trial
court found that [the declarant] was concerned with
getting appellant "off the hook;' since she believed she
had a viable defense, namely battered woman's syndrome, that would exonerate her from all liability for the
crime. Therefore, we find sufficient evidence in the
record to support the trial court's conclusion that the
[corroboration] required by Evid.R. 803(8)(3) was not
satisfied.

GRAND JURYTESTIMONY
Ohio Rule 804(8)(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for
former testimony. Grand jury testimony is not admissible
against a criminal defendant because the opportunity to examine the declarant is lacking. State v. Woods, 48 Ohio
App.3d 1, 5, 548 N.E.2d 954 (1988). In contrast, the prosecution is provided that opportunity, and some cases have
ruled that grand jury testimony may be admissible against
the government. For example, in United States v. Foster,
128 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 1997), the court noted that
"[t]hree Circuits have suggested and the District of
Columbia Circuit has affirmatively ruled that the government
has the same motive to develop a witness' testimony during
a grand jury proceeding as it does at trial." See also United
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. Henry, 448 F.Supp 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978).
In United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir.
1997), the First Circuit agreed that grand jury testimony may
fall within the purview of the former testimony rule in some
cases, but such a case would be rare because the prosecution's motive is often different at the grand jury than at trial.
The court wrote: "Grand juries present a different face.
Often, the government neither aims to discredit the witness
nor to vouch for him. The prosecution may want to secure a
small piece of evidence as part of an ongoing investigation
or to compel an answer by an unwilling witness or to 'freeze'
the posit.ion of.an ad~erse witness. In particular, discrediting
a grand Jury w1tness 1s rarely essential, because the government has a modest burden of proof, selects its own witnesses, and can usually call more of them at its leisure:' ld. at
523. VVhile this argument has merit, tile defense could
make a comparable argument concerning preliminary hearing testimony, and yet such testimony has been admitted,
even in face of a confrontation challenge. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (dissent); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (dissent).
Moreover, the rule requires only that the "opportunity" to
develop the testimony by examination has been provided at
the former hearing. "Actual cross-examination, of course, is
not essential, if the opportunity was afforded and waived:' 2
McCormick, Evidence§ 302, at 306 (4th ed. 1992). See
also State v Jester, 32 O.S.3d 147, 153, 512 N.E.2d 962
(1 ~87), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); 5 Wigmore,
Ev1dence § 1371 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). Failure to examine
the declarant for tactical reasons does not change the result. E.g., Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d
1492, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[A]s a general rule, a party's
decision to limit cross-examination in a discovery deposition

IMPEACHMENT OF HEARSAY DECLARANTS
Ohio Rule 806 governs the admissibility of evidence relating to the credibility of hearsay declarants. As the federal
drafters explained, "The declarant of a hearsay statement
which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His
credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and
support as though he had in fact testified:' Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 806. Accordingly, these declarants may be impeached by showing bias, untruthfulness
character, evidence of prior convictions, inconsistent statements, and so forth.
If an accused's hears~y statements are elicited by the defense through another Witness, Rule 806 applies, and the
accused may be impeached with evidence of a conviction.
In other words, an accused may be impeached even though
he never testified. See United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d
1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818
(1985); United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, 1130 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1091 (1980). See generally Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of the
Nontestifying Defendant, 56 Ohio St. L. J. 495, 504 (1995).
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